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Governments, policy makers and scientists in all countries need to understand 
how well their healthcare system performs. Every country in Europe is now 
contending with rapidly escalating costs in the healthcare sector, but at the 
same time we are also benefiting from better survival rates for cancer and heart 
attacks. Life expectancy among people in rich countries continues to rise and the 
adoption of new treatments and technologies (such as drugs to control HIV and 
proton therapy, a new way to treat cancer) is having a clear impact.
The evolution of the healthcare sector in economically developed countries has 
occurred in three distinct waves (Cutler 2002). The first wave involved ensuring 
better access to medical care. Since health technology was neither very advanced 
nor very costly at that time, equity rather than efficiency was the primary policy 
concern when healthcare systems were first set up. However, the rapid pace of 
technological change meant that, over time, ever more resources were being 
poured into hospital care to pay for nursing, intensive care, radiology and drug 
supplies. As both the scale and – ultimately – the cost of hospital services 
increased dramatically, healthcare became the largest sector of the economy in 
the majority of developed countries.
In response to this rapid, technology-driven increase in the cost of providing 
healthcare, many countries imposed regulatory limits on healthcare spending 
during what Cutler calls the second wave. Such rationing mechanisms included 
price controls, budget caps, and barriers to entry for both physicians (e.g. 
licensing) and hospitals (e.g. certificates-of-need). But these rationing 
mechanisms had two adverse effects for consumers. The first of these was 
waiting lists, which led to increasing consumer dissatisfaction. Secondly, they 
created inefficiencies in the provision of healthcare because cost controls led to 
both the suboptimal allocation of resources and limited incentives for providers 
to respond to consumers’ needs.
Growing dissatisfaction with rationing among consumers of healthcare led to a 
shift towards incentive-based systems (such as greater competition and yardstick 
regulation) during the third wave of healthcare reform, which has been pursued 
the furthest in the United States, and more recently in European countries such 
as the Netherlands. Increased incentives for healthcare providers can lead to the 
better allocation of resources and make them more responsive to their competi-
tive environment (competitors, suppliers, insurers and, ultimately, patients).
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Figure 1: Total spending on healthcare in the Netherlands as a percentage of GDP.
An example of this is shown in Figure 1, which provides a historical overview of 
spending on healthcare in the Netherlands (expressed as percentage of GDP). 
The fi rst two phases of Cutler (2002) can be seen in this Figure. In the fi rst 
phase (which continued until the early 1980s) access and equity were the main 
goals of public policy. Insurance coverage was extended and more facilities were 
built, leading to an increase in healthcare expenditure.
 
In the early 1980s, the Netherlands entered the ‘second phase’, introducing 
budgets for healthcare providers (e.g. for hospitals in 1983 and medical 
specialists in 1986). Throughout the 1980s, the Netherlands managed to keep 
healthcare costs under control: spending on healthcare remained broadly stable 
as a percentage of GDP. However, by the 1990s the tighter budgets were leading 
to considerable public dissatisfaction due to waiting lists and perceived falls in 
the quality standards. In 2001 a new policy gave every citizen the right to access 
healthcare, which meant that waiting lists should disappear. As a consequence, 
however, healthcare spending rose sharply once again.
At this point, the government had a number of options for restraining 
expenditure and ensuring an affordable system of healthcare. The option of 
rationing healthcare through budgeting and price regulation has already been 
abandoned. Another option for curbing expenditure would be to limit the scope 
of mandatory insurance. This could be done be increasing co-payments and 
limiting the standard benefi ts package. This is possible in theory, but in practice 
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it would be difficult in political terms (see Dranove (2003) for an overview of 
the practice of rationing in a range of different countries). Instead, the Dutch 
government chose the path of reforming the healthcare system by introducing 
managed competition and incentives: Cultler’s ‘third wave’ (2002).
In this address, I will discuss important aspects of the Dutch system of managed 
competition from the economic perspective, highlighting both its merits and 
the major challenges posed by the development of this system. Firstly, I will 
discuss the reasons why governments intervene in healthcare markets at all, and 
outline the different types of healthcare systems. Then I will describe the Dutch 
healthcare system and compare healthcare outcomes in different countries. I 
will conclude with some suggestions for improving the Dutch system. 
Public objectives 
In countries where (price) competition1 in the healthcare sector plays a role, 
competition is not a goal in itself but is seen as the best mechanism for 




Healthcare needs to be accessible, by which we mean that individual patients 
are able to access hospital care when they need it, but also that patients are able 
to cover the cost of the treatment that they require. As we have seen, healthcare 
treatments have become very expensive, meaning that healthcare insurance 
plays a vital role. Since private insurance will not always be attainable for vulner-
able groups (e.g. elderly), governments in all Western countries intervene in the 
health insurance market. Some governments provide state health insurance for 
all their citizens (e.g. the UK and Denmark), others offer a special government 
insurance scheme for vulnerable groups like the elderly (for example Medicare 
in the US), and others still require all their citizens to take out private (but 
state-regulated) insurance (which is the case in the Netherlands). 
1 In countries like the UK and Denmark there is no price competition, but hospitals are subject to 
some form of (quality) competition.
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All countries share the same concerns about rises in healthcare spending. This 
is because in all countries – as we will see later in the address – healthcare   
expenditure remains on a steady upwards trajectory and makes up an ever larger 
share of national income. Since a large proportion of the cost of healthcare is 
covered collectively, countries need to make choices. Rising healthcare costs can 
either be covered by tax increases, which would mean that healthcare spending 
will crowd out public spending in other areas (such as education and social 
welfare), or a larger share of the cost of healthcare will need to be borne by 
patients.
Of course, we all want accessible and affordable healthcare, but spending money 
on healthcare only makes sense if we do this in a way that leads to good quality. 
The three core objectives that we mentioned above – accessibility, affordability 
and quality – often conflict with one another. For example, we would normally 
assume that improving quality will involve cost increases, and so there is a clear 
conflict between quality and affordability. Another example is that providing 
greater accessibility (by increasing the insurance coverage or by building more 
facilities) may undermine affordability. And the goals of quality and accessibility 
may also conflict. For some treatments, there is a positive relationship between 
the volume of treatments and clinical outcomes (see Halm et al. 2002 for 
examples and a literature overview). To improve quality, it makes sense to 
concentrate these treatments, but this may require patients to travel further, 
implying a sacrifice in terms of accessibility.
In order to achieve these public policy objectives, the healthcare system must be 
structured and coordinated in such a way that the right services and products 
are produced at the right time, in the right place, by the right medical personnel. 
This coordination includes quality and accessibility. What is more, the 
healthcare system needs to incentivize individual decision makers (e.g. insurers, 
hospitals, doctors and so forth) to make coordinated decisions. In other words, 
individual decision makers must be incentivized at the individual level to 
produce healthcare that accords with public policy objectives. And finally, the 
healthcare system needs to provide this coordination and incentivization with 
the lowest possible transaction costs.
There are two contrasting approaches to achieving coordination. One approach 
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is hierarchical planning, whereby a central decision-maker calculates what 
all those involved need to do, and instructs or ‘commands’ them to do it. The 
other approach is the use of the market. This ‘invisible hand’ work through the 
gradual balancing of supply and demand, determining the overall plan which 
is, at the same time, implemented through decentralized responses to price 
changes.
From a theoretical point of view and assuming perfect information, the general 
characteristics of the market and hierarchical solutions are quite similar. The 
virtues of price mechanisms are often emphasized with reference to neo-
classical microeconomics. According to the first and second welfare theorem 
in microeconomics, a perfect price mechanism will lead to a situation of Pareto 
optimality and, under certain conditions, Pareto optimality can be maintained 
as competitive equilibrium with certain prices. In other words, the same 
solutions are possible using both the market and planning. In reality, a planning 
approach can usually accomplish this using less restrictive assumptions about 
technologies and preferences. Traditional prices, for example, have problems 
supporting some Pareto optimal outcomes when production possibilities are not 
convex.
When the assumption of perfect information is relaxed and incentives and 
motivation becomes relevant, the two approaches diverge more and their 
performance naturally depends on who knows what. A common belief is 
that market solutions are better with motivation problems, simply because a 
private profit motive provides good protection against waste. However, it is also 
possible to design private profit incentives in hierarchies, as documented by the 
many management bonus programs in today’s large corporations. The crucial 
question with regard to asymmetric information is, therefore, who has the 
superior information. It is usually a good idea to allocate decision-making rights 
to the most well-informed part of the economic system.
Scientifically speaking, then, and despite recent debates and trends, we cannot 
conclude that one of these systems – hierarchical or market-based – is better 
than the other. It all depends on the context and on the weight that is assigned 
to the various objectives of the system. In fact, most mechanisms use a 
combination of pricing and directives, and both centralized and decentralized 
coordination.
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Market failures in the healthcare sector
In a world without market failures, markets could resolve all coordination and 
motivation problems and, in terms of the Arrow-Debreu neoclassical general 
equilibrium model, lead to first best outcomes (Arrow and Debreu 1954). 
However, in reality, markets are not failure-free. This is why non-market 
relations and institutions, such as vertical integration and government 
intervention, came about in order to mitigate for market failures.
Market failures occur when markets fail to achieve efficient allocation. They can 
be caused by market power, externalities, information asymmetry and public 
goods. In the healthcare sector, information asymmetry, market power and 
externalities are the most important sources of market failure.
In a world in which there was an omniscient and benevolent regulator, able to 
ensure complete implementation of its decisions, market failures would be 
corrected, and it would still be possible to achieve a first best outcome. 
Unfortunately, in practice, government interventions that were designed to 
resolve market failures have in turn given rise to new coordination and 
motivation problems (Milgrom and Roberts, 1992). These government failures 
arise because governments do not have perfect information about the markets 
in which they are intervening. This information asymmetry complicates the 
motivations of the parties involved.
As a sector, healthcare is plagued by market failures. It is for this reason that 
governments in all countries provide healthcare, either through state insurance 
(e.g. Denmark and the UK) or heavy intervention in and/or regulation of the 
healthcare system (e.g. in the US and the Netherlands).
Any reorganization of the healthcare system is a complicated task, and more 
government intervention can easily create more problems than it solves. It is 
therefore very important to reflect carefully on the multiple effects of changes in 
the healthcare sector. It is easy to solve one problem (e.g. excessive rents) only 
to create new problems (e.g. destroying incentives for efficiency and investment 
in innovation). Well-designed healthcare regulation needs to anticipate any such 
effects and take them into account.
In particular, this concerns special features of public industries such as intrinsic 
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motivation (e.g. for doctors), long-term investment and multiple regulations 
(e.g. on price and on quality). In economic theory, agents are assumed to be 
opportunistic and rational. In reality, however, people also have altruistic 
motivations and may be intrinsically motivated to carry out certain public 
tasks. Arrow (1963) notes that “when the market fails to achieve an optimal 
state, society will, to some extend at least, recognize the gap, and non-market 
institutions will arise attempting to bridge it”. I will discuss these ‘non-market 
institutions’ below. The way in which the healthcare system is structured and 
restructured can undermine intrinsic motivation and non-market institutions 
such as social capital and trust.
Similarly, the design of any healthcare system should take into account the 
long-term effects of certain incentives. Long-term effects include the effect on 
innovation and the structure of the sector (incentives may affect the number 
and the size of firms, entry into and exit from the sector, location, etc.). In 
addition to being regulated on price, healthcare providers are also regulated in 
other ways (e.g. quality regulations) and also have to live with changes in market 
conditions.
When Kenneth Arrow wrote his seminal article on healthcare (Arrow 1963), 
he was the first to reconcile economic theory with the healthcare sector. In 
his article, Arrow not only applied standard economic economics2 but he 
also offered an explanation for what he called “non-market institutions”. His 
explanation for non-market institutions, such as not-for-profit healthcare 
providers and government interventions, was market failures like uncertainty 
and asymmetric information. He states that:
“The failure of one or more of the competitive preconditions has as its most 
immediate and obvious consequence a reduction of welfare.... I propose here the 
view that, when the market fails to achieve an optimal state, society will, to some 
extend at least, recognize the gap, and nonmarket social institutions will arise 
attempting to bridge it.”
So in order to understand both market and non-market institutions in the 
healthcare sector, and their impact on the structure of the market, we need to 
2  By which I mean competition and utility maximizing agents.
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delve a little deeper into the detail of market failures. Market failures distort 
outcomes in a competitive market. In this address, I will focus on the main 
market failures that are relevant to national healthcare systems. I will start with 
market failures in health insurance markets – caused by the non-marketability 
of risk and asymmetric information. Then I will discuss two important market 
failures in healthcare provision: the so-called ‘shopping problem’, which arises 
because of asymmetric information and search costs, and the ‘differentiated 
good problem’, which is associated with market power in these markets.
Marketability of risk
The most obvious reason for market failures in the healthcare sector (noted 
by Arrow in 1963) is that healthy persons do not know whether and when 
they may fall ill: in other words, their demand for healthcare is stochastic. 
Nevertheless, illness remains a serious risk for most people, with the potential 
to impact significantly on their life. Their health, jobs and lifestyle can all be 
put in jeopardy, and of course, there is always the risk of death. Because of the 
significant potential impact of illness, the benefits of treatment often exceed its 
price – even when that price is very high. This combination of uncertainty and 
the high costs associated with medical treatment means that there is a demand 
for health insurance. However, the health insurance market is vulnerable to 
market failures.  
Adverse selection and moral hazard are both special cases of information 
asymmetry between buyers and sellers on a market. While adverse selection 
refers to effects of information asymmetry before a contract has been signed, 
moral hazard refers to effects of information asymmetry after a contract has 
been signed.
George Akerlof (1970) pioneered the idea of adverse selection in his seminal 
paper about the market for used cars, for which he was awarded a Nobel Prize. 
To summarize, if sellers know more about the quality of the cars they sell than 
buyers, the market may break down. If buyers know nothing about the quality of 
a used car, they are likely to be inclined only to buy cheap cars of low quality and 
refuse to buy a more expensive car, because they cannot tell whether it really 
is better quality. A nice classroom experiment designed by Holt and Sherman 
(1999), which I often use in teaching, illustrates this mechanism very neatly. 
In the health insurance market, adverse selection plays a big role. It explains 
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why young and healthy people may not avoid purchasing health insurance, and 
why health insurance companies may not want to sell insurances to elderly and 
unhealthy people.
Moral hazard occurs after the contract has been signed. Unless the contract 
specifies that the consequences of taking risks are borne by the policyholder, the 
policyholder may be inclined to take more risks than otherwise. An insurance 
policy is a contract that shifts the risk from the policyholder to an insurance 
company. If people are insured against the consequences of, let’s say, theft, they 
may start making less effort when it comes to watching or safeguarding the 
items that they have insured. In terms of health insurance, an insured person 
may be inclined to neglect his or her health (by, for example, taking too little 
exercise), and rely on medication instead. Both adverse selection and moral 
hazard pose serious challenges in any healthcare system, and thus deserve more 
attention in this lecture.
Adverse selection
Adverse selection is a significant market failure in the healthcare sector, 
particularly in health insurance. It explains why governments intervene in 
healthcare markets to the extent that they do. Arrow (1963) remarked that non-
market institutions may arise to bridge the gap caused by market failures. In 
health insurance markets, governments intervene in the form of regulation.
The market for health insurance is severely undermined by adverse selection for 
two reasons. On the one hand, consumers may have more information about 
their health status than insurers. Since health insurance implies a redistribution 
of income from healthy people to ill people, healthy people who are unlikely 
to fall ill may have an incentive not to take out insurance if the premium 
exceeds what they consider to be reasonable (depending on their health status). 
However, if relatively healthy people do not take out health insurance, the 
burden of cost falls on another group of policyholders, pushing up insurance 
premiums. In turn, these persons may prefer to remain uninsured and so on, 
until the market collapses. This mechanism is known as adverse selection.
On the other hand, insurers may be able to predict healthcare costs for a given 
consumer based on their characteristics (their gender, age, source of income, 
etc.). Leaving health insurance provision to a free, unregulated market will 
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therefore lead to very expensive insurance for certain patient groups (e.g. the 
elderly), even to the point where it becomes unattainable. This mechanism is 
known as risk selection by insurers.
The first point to note is that healthcare costs are characterized “both by large 
random variation as well as large predictable variation across individuals” 
(Ellis and Van de Ven, 2000). For example, Figure 2 shows the distribution of 
healthcare cost across the population of the Netherlands.
Figure 2: The distribution of healthcare costs3
The distribution the cost of healthcare is very unevenly distributed. Figure 2 
shows that the ‘most expensive’ 1% of the population is responsible for 23% of 
the spending on curative healthcare, while some 49% of the healthcare costs are 
directed at the top 5% of healthcare consumers.
3  Source: Risk adjustment data 2013, NZa
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Figure 3: Healthcare spending per age-category in the Netherlands4, estimated amounts 2016
Healthcare costs are also – to some extent – predictable. Figure 3 shows that 
healthcare costs depend on gender and age.
If insurance companies offered just one type of insurance, without premium 
differentiation, young and unhealthy people may not want to take out health 
insurance, because the premiums would be much higher than the expected 
cost. However, if health insurers offered different policies for different types 
of clients (e.g. cheaper insurance for young males and expensive insurance for 
the elderly or for women aged between 20 and 40), the premiums might be too 
expensive for these specifi c groups.
Left to its own devices, the health insurance market would break down due 
to adverse selection, so most governments intervene in these markets. The 
state may offer health insurance itself, as is the case in countries like the UK, 
Sweden and France, or it may strictly regulate private (or public) insurance 
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US has traditionally used a mixed approach. A free market, including adverse 
selection, for a part of the population, but with state insurance for vulnerable 
groups (e.g. Medicare for the elderly, Medicaid and SCHIP for low income 
children and their families, (IHS) for native Americans and VA and TRICARE 
for veterans and  active duty service members). To increase risk-solidarity in 
health insurance, countries with private insurance markets, in particular the 
Netherlands, have enacted mandatory health insurance with restrictions on 
premium differentiation, in which risk-adjustment compensates insurers for 
differences between their policyholders. I will elaborate on this point later, when 
we come to discuss the Dutch healthcare system in more detail. 
 
Moral hazard
Moral hazard is the second form of market failure that impacts on behavior 
after the health insurance contract has been signed. Since insurers5  cover all 
or most of the cost of treatment, consumers will tend to consume too much 6. 
The most convincing study into the existence and impact of moral hazard was 
the ‘Rand experiment’ (see Dranove (2003) for a good description of the Rand 
experiment), conducted in the 1970s 7. In this experiment, consumers were 
randomly assigned to healthcare insurances with different levels of co-payments 
and deductibles. For some consumers, co-payments and deductibles were zero. 
These consumers had all their costs reimbursed. Another group of consumers 
had to pay up to 25% of their healthcare expenditure. Others had to pay very 
large deductibles, which meant they were only insured against ‘catastrophic’ 
risks. Even three decades after the main findings of the study were presented, 
the conclusions are still considered to be robust: co-payments and deductibles 
help to reduce moral hazard (Aron-Dine et al. 2013). A potential negative 
effect is that enrollees who have signed up to pay deductibles may reduce their 
healthcare consumption or delay receiving the healthcare that they need. The 
RAND Health Insurance Experiment found that higher cost-sharing led to 
reductions in the consumption of both essential and non-essential medical care. 
5 Including ‘state insurance’. 
6 An economist might say that the consumer consumes more than the efficient level because he does 
not pay the marginal cost of the last unit of healthcare given to him. 
7 See Aron-Dine et al. (2013) for a discussion about the Rand experiment. 
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The reduction of health care consumption did not affect the health status of the 
majority of the population. However, the health status of the enrollees with a 
low income and poor health was negatively affected (Newhouse, 2004).
Despite this, in most countries with state insurance or mandatory private 
insurance, co-payments and deductibles are either absent or very low because 
increasing co-payments and deductibles are very unpopular with the general 
public, which has generally led governments to avoid them. Furthermore, 
increasing copayments is at odds with the rationale of health insurance, which 
is namely to protect consumers from high and unexpected healthcare costs 
(Dranove 2003).
The ‘shopping problem’.
Consumers are not only uncertain about when and whether they will fall ill. 
When they do fall ill, they normally do not know which type(s) of healthcare 
they need, how much of it, and where to obtain it. Furthermore, many illnesses 
require treatment by doctors with different specialties. Since most patients 
know very little about which healthcare they need, they are not in a position to 
coordinate the activities of the various doctors involved. Finally, it is very hard 
for patients to evaluate the effectiveness of the treatment ex post, because some 
‘good’ treatments may prove ineffective, while other patients may recover after 
ineffective treatment. This set of issues is known as the ‘shopping problem’.
For these reasons, consumers do not usually make their own healthcare 
decisions, but do this through secondary markets or intermediaries. Insurers 
shift the costly risks of uncertain demand away from consumers. Primary 
care physicians help consumers to identify and find the healthcare that they 
need (see Gaynor et al. 2012 for the positive effects of the help of primary 
care physician on the quality of care in the UK). Hospitals coordinate complex 
healthcare services that are tailored to the patient’s needs and monitor treatment 
outcomes. The providers of healthcare (physicians) not only provide treatment, 
but also diagnosis as well as advice on which treatment is needed. This gives 
rise to agency problems, since the doctor may diagnose wrongly and/or direct 
the patient to receive too much or too little treatment.
The phenomenon of doctors prescribing treatment that is too expensive 
(because more expensive treatment is more profitable for doctors) is known as 
‘supplier-induced demand’.
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Regulations that aim to mitigate the shopping problem include setting 
standards and rules on transparency.
Differentiated products and market power
Healthcare is a differentiated product. This means that sellers of healthcare have 
market power. The preferences of patients are also heterogeneous. Location 
is a particular source of differentiation in healthcare markets. Since patients 
are spatially dispersed and will naturally prefer to receive treatment nearby, 
healthcare markets tend to be local. The distance between the patient and the 
hospital accounts for 74% of the statistical variance in the hospital choices made 
by patients in the Netherlands (see Halbersma et al. 2009). 
Hospital markets in countries like the US, UK and the Netherlands are highly 
concentrated (Gaynor and Town 2012). In theory, concentration may lead 
to economies of scale and scope and therefore have a positive effect on the 
delivered quality and prices. Market power, on the other hand, may lead to 
higher prices and lower quality. Most empirical studies show that concentration 
leads to higher prices (see Gaynor and Town 2012), while the effect of 
concentration on quality is less clear. When prices are regulated (as in the UK 
and Medicare in the US, for example), most studies find that competition has 
a positive impact on quality. With liberalized prices, the effect varies between 
studies: some papers show that competition has a positive effect on quality, 
while other show the opposite.8 The problems of market power in healthcare 
provision have been addressed by regulation, which I will discuss next.
Sector-specific regulations and competition policy
Because of the market failures described in the previous sections, healthcare 
markets are characterized by a significant level of government intervention. 
Government intervention can vary from the supply of healthcare by state-run 
hospitals and ‘employee-physicians’ – as in the UK and Denmark and state-
provided insurance in the US9 – to extensive regulation of insurance markets 
(mandates, coverage, community-based premiums) and healthcare provision 
(market entry, price regulation and (tax)benefits for non-for-profit providers).
8 See Gaynor and Town (2012) for an overview.
9 Medicare, Medicaid and provision of healthcare to veterans
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Most OECD countries regulate entry into the market for healthcare providers. 
They regulate the entry of medical staff (such as nurses and doctors), the entry 
of hospitals and the diffusion of new technology. There are two main reasons 
for this kind of regulation. The first is the healthcare policy objective of curbing 
the growth in healthcare spending and the idea that oversupply may lead to 
supplier-induced demand for healthcare. The second reason is to mitigate the 
‘shopping problem’ outlined above. The main idea of supplier-induced demand 
is that an increase in both the supply and the number of suppliers of healthcare 
will lead to an increase in demand for healthcare. Although the existence of 
this phenomenon is broadly accepted, its prevalence is not well understood. 
Research into supplier-induced demand generally finds a (positive) correlation 
between the number of healthcare suppliers and the number of physicians in a 
certain area. However, the causality of this relationship is unclear, as illustrated 
by the following citation from Auster and Oaxaca 198110:
“There was once a cholera epidemic in Russia. The government, in an effort 
to stem the disease, sent doctors to the worst-affected areas. The peasants in 
the province of S discussed the situation and observed a very high correlation 
between the number of doctors in a given area and the incidence of cholera in 
that area. Relying on this hard fact, they rose and murdered their doctors”.
In most OECD countries, hospital prices are regulated in various ways. Prices 
are either regulated centrally or locally. For example, since 2006 the UK 
Department has set nationwide HRG prices11. In other countries, such as 
Denmark, local government is responsible for the contracting and budgeting of 
hospitals. In countries where insurers act as third party payers, hospital prices 
are still regulated, with the notable exception of the US and some hospital 
production in the Netherlands. 
With respect to the quality objective, many countries have inspectorates to 
safeguard (minimum) quality and patient safety. Countries like the UK and 
the Netherlands also try to improve transparency in relation to the standard of 
quality provided.
10 I owe this quote to Pomp (2010)
11 HRG is the British equivalent of DRGs.
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Salkever (2000) writes about the regulation of prices and investment in hospi-
tals in the US. Due to significant growth in healthcare spending, many states 
in the US have started to regulate prices and hospital investment. The most 
important regulations were the implementation of rate setting (e.g. for Medi-
care, see Shleifer 1985 for a description of the Medicare Prospective Payment 
System), and so-called Certificates of Need for new entrants, investment and the 
provision of new services by existing providers. Empirical research by Salkever 
2000 shows that the effect of such regulation remains unclear.
Competition policy
In the past, competition law was not applicable to the healthcare sector for 
several reasons. However, in response to an increase in competition in the 
healthcare sector, more and more competition authorities around the world 
do now apply competition law to the healthcare sector. In the US, for instance, 
competition law has been applied since 1976 (DOJ and FTC (2004) and Gaynor 
(2000)). In Europe, many hospitals are state-owned, meaning that they are not 
always classified as “undertakings” and are therefore not subject to competition 
law. In Germany and the Netherlands, hospitals (and insurers) are privately 
owned12, so competition law applies to the healthcare sector in these countries. 
But even where healthcare institutions are not state-owned, the courts may 
decide that certain institutions cannot be treated as undertakings, and that 
competition law does not apply to these firms. An example of the latter is a 
decision by the Brussels Court of Appeal that a Belgian health insurance fund 
did not qualify as an undertaking.13 
It is widely recognized that the introduction of patient choice means competi-
tion between hospitals, however. So even in countries where competition law 
does not apply to healthcare institutions, there are concerns about the level of 
competition in the healthcare sector. In the UK, for example, the government 
has established a sector-specific organization named the Co-operation and 
Competition Panel (CCP) to handle matters relating to competition between 
NHS hospitals. The CCP assumes that competition between hospitals promotes 
the delivery of higher-quality care for patients and better value for money for 
taxpayers. The body investigates cases where hospitals engage in anticompeti-
12 Although often by foundations and trusts and often not-for-profit}
13 See the case of Kristel Cools BVBA versus Christelijke Mutualiteit Antwerpen published on 
http://www.concurrences.com/IMG/pdf/2009_10_02_Belgium01Doc_KUL-81_-2.pdf
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tive practices and makes independent recommendations to the Department of 
Health and Monitor regarding how such cases should be resolved. It also re-
views proposed mergers, and advises on the wider development of co-operation, 
patient choice and competition within the NHS.14 
The assessment of mergers by competition authorities is based on the assump-
tion that a higher market share may lead to higher prices. This assumption is 
based on the economics paradigm of Structure Conduct Performance. All the 
steps in assessing a merger therefore boil down to the definition of the relevant 
market. If the market is defined too narrowly, firms active in that market will 
inevitably have a higher share of that market and mergers will be blocked even if 
there is no evidence of mitigating factors (step 5). On the other hand, if markets 
are defined too broadly, firms will inevitably have a smaller market share and 
mergers are more likely to be approved. The assumption that a higher market 
share will lead to higher prices stems from a Cournot model of competition (see 
Motta (2004) for a description of the different models of competition) between 
producers of homogenous goods. As described previously, the assumption that 
healthcare providers generally (and hospitals in particular) provide homogenous 
goods is not particularly realistic. The problem with the delineation of relevant 
markets in the case of differentiated products is that it considers a certain prod-
uct as either a “full” substitute or as no substitute at all. In practice, however, 
many products and certainly hospitals are imperfect substitutes for any given 
patient. Whether a certain hospital is a good substitute for another hospital will 
depend on both the characteristics of the patient in question (such as their med-
ical condition, age, gender and location) and the characteristics of the hospital 
(such as location, perceived quality, treatments offered, status etc.). If we take 
travel distance from the patient’s home to the hospital as an example, some 
hospitals are more attractive than others just because they are located nearer to 
the patient than others. The binary decision on whether or not to include a par-
ticular hospital does not reflect a much more complex reality, in which hospitals 
may be able to substitute each other to a certain extent, in certain cases.
Different systems of healthcare delivery
Different countries have designed different healthcare systems to mitigate 
the effects of the market failures that we have examined. They have developed 
14 see http://www.ccpanel.org.uk/  for more information.
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different solutions for the following reasons: 
• circumstances are different;
• the development of healthcare systems is path dependent;
• every solution has a drawback.
Firstly, circumstances are different in every country. For example, price 
competition between healthcare providers may be possible in densely populated 
countries such as the Netherlands, but price competition in countries like 
Sweden and Norway, both large, sparsely inhabited countries, is much 
more difficult. In these countries, the majority of hospitals may be regional 
monopolies.
Secondly, countries have different histories. The decisions and organizational 
structures of the past may exclude or reinforce certain decisions today. Systems 
are generally not subject radically reforms, but are gradually improved. For 
example, while in the UK and the Scandinavian countries, the healthcare system 
has always been funded through general taxation, Germany and the Netherlands 
have always had private (not-for-profit) social insurers. The existence of the latter 
has made it a more natural step for the Netherlands to implement a system of 
managed competition.
Thirdly, any healthcare solution has its drawbacks. Due to market failures in the 
healthcare sector, there is no panacea. Any organization will have to compromise 
on some of the objectives, and institutional design will depend on preferences, 
policy goals and current and past circumstances.
However, despite the major differences between countries, in all countries 
there is government intervention in the healthcare system. In some cases the 
government acts as an insurer. For example, the government insures all citizens 
in countries like the UK and Denmark. In other countries, like the US, the 
government acts as an insurer for specific vulnerable groups such as the elderly 
(Medicare), the poor (Medicaid) and veterans (Veterans Affairs).
Different countries choose different systems, ranging from a complete 
hierarchical system in which the government takes care of both the insurance 
and the provision of healthcare. Examples of such countries are the UK and 
Denmark.
In these healthcare systems both insurance and the provision of healthcare are 
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provided by the state and state-owned organizations. Medical staff are generally 
public sector employees.
The solution to the problem of adverse selection and guaranteeing universal 
access to healthcare (insurance) has been organized by the state. This leads 
the state to contain budgets by rationing access to healthcare (e.g. by the late 
introduction of new medical technology and/or the acceptance of waiting lists), 
because the state is responsible for both healthcare budgets and healthcare 
access. However, a state-owned organization can lead to weaker incentives 
to improve efficiency and quality. A good regulatory regime or good public 
contracting that incorporates prospective payment plans, for example (Shleifer 
1985), benchmarking and yardstick competition (Agrell et al. 2007) may 
enhance efficiency. These systems are generally considered to by supplier-driven 
rather than consumer-driven (Docteur 2003).
In other countries, systems have developed whereby both health insurance 
and the provision of healthcare are private matters. The US is one example. 
To cope with the adverse selection problem, described above, the government 
incentivizes healthcare insurance through tax deductibles for employers 
and “state” insurance schemes for vulnerable groups. The US department 
of Veterans Affairs even provides care through state-run hospitals. In fact, 
the Veterans Affairs system is largest integrated healthcare system of the US 
consisting of 168 medical centers15, in addition to numerous community-based 
outpatient clinics16. 
So at one end of the spectrum we have a hierarchical, state-run system and, 
at the other, a system of no mandatory health insurance and the government 
insures vulnerable groups. The healthcare system of the Netherlands is a 
compromise between these two. 
The Netherlands introduced managed competition in 2006. The Dutch model 
is based on mandatory health insurance for all Dutch citizens, whereby private 
health insurers offer a standard package of healthcare benefits and compete to 
attract consumers. It is  comparable to the system in Switzerland. Below I will 
describe the Dutch system in more detail.
15 Source: http://www.va.gov/health/FindCare.asp
16 See http://www2.va.gov/directory/guide/map_flsh.asp?isflash= for an overview of the Veterans 
Affairs facilities
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Finally, one country’s healthcare system is worth a particular mention – 
Singapore. In Singapore, citizens are legally obliged to save money for medical 
expenses. The government provides an insurance scheme for “catastrophic” 
illnesses and expensive treatments (see Lim 2004).
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The Dutch system
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Three pillars of the Dutch healthcare system.
The Dutch healthcare system consists of three “pillars”. The first pillar is tax-
funded “government insurance” for long-term care.17 The second pillar is 
mandatory health insurance for all Dutch citizens. The coverage of this 
mandatory insurance is determined by the government and includes GP care, 
hospital care, drugs, natal care, curative mental care, ambulance and patient-
transport services and some paramedical care (e.g. physiotherapy for chronic 
diseases, speech therapy and occupational therapy). 
Figure 4: An overview of the three pillars in the Dutch healthcare system
Source: Budget of the Dutch Ministry of Health 201618 Source for the complementary insurance: CBS19
The third pillar is voluntary complementary insurance, which can cover 
anything (from spectacles to paramedical care that is not covered by the 
mandatory insurance and alternative medicine). A large percentage of the 
population purchases this supplementary insurance, although the percentage 
declined from 89% of the population in 2011 to 84.1% in 2015.20
17 In 2015 the responsibility for residential care and youth care was transferred from the state to the 
local municipalities, see Maarse and Jeurissen 2016 for a complete overview of the 2015 reforms in the 
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In this inaugural address, we will focus on the mandatory insurance package 
(the second pillar). This system was introduced in 2006 by the Health 
Insurance Act (ZVW) and the Dutch Healthcare Market Regulation Act (WMG).
Introduction of competition
The principal behind the Dutch system that was introduced in 2006 is that 
insurers compete for consumers and that healthcare providers compete for 
contracts with health insurers.
The main characteristic of the Dutch model of managed competition is that 
consumers can exercise freedom of choice about which insurer they use. 
Consumers may switch to a rival insurer to seek a better price for their 
insurance, better service, or better value in the underlying provider network. 
The aim of this model is to align the commercial interests of insurers with 
consumers’ health and fi nancial wellbeing, whereby insurers can prosper by 
purchasing healthcare for consumers in the most prudent way (See Mikkers and 
Ryan 2014). 
Figure 5: the idea behind competition in healthcare markets21
21 Soure of the fi gure is Mikkers and Ryan (2014).
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Based on Capps et al. (2003), we could describe health insurance as an option 
on a bundle of access rights for healthcare providers. Because consumers 
choose the insurance with the best network for them, given their specific 
characteristics, health insurers are incentivized to contract the best healthcare 
providers.
Healthcare insurers are not obliged to contract all healthcare providers: selective 
contracting is permitted. Selective contracting means that insurers may exclude 
inefficient or poor-quality providers from contracts and negotiate all dimensions 
in the contract (e.g. price, quality and volume).
Prices in the Dutch hospital sector were liberalized gradually from 10% of 
hospital production in 2006 to over 30% in 2009. In 2012, the liberalized 
part was extended to all elective care (roughly 70% of hospital production). In 
some other sectors such as physiotherapy and pharmacy, prices have also been 
liberalized (See Mikkers and Ryan 2014). 
Regulation in the insurance market
Every Dutch citizen is required by law to take out health insurance covering a 
standard package of benefits that is determined by the government. Although 
selective contracting is allowed, insurers are required to contract enough 
healthcare to meet the demand of their enrollees (“zorgplicht”). This means that 
waiting lists are not acceptable in the Dutch healthcare system. Insurers are also 
obliged to provide services to all consumers, regardless of their health status: 
acceptance is mandatory and there can be no premium differentiation. To keep 
the healthcare system accessible for those on lower incomes, to prevent risk 
selection and to provide a level playing field for insurers, the government has 
designed an ingenious financing and compensation scheme.
Financing the healthcare system and risk solidarity
To ensure that the Dutch healthcare system remains accessible for those on 
lower incomes, roughly half22 of the estimated expenses under the Health 
Insurance Act are collected by the government on the basis of an income 
dependent premium. The other half of the estimated costs is funded through a 
nominal premium charged by the insurers to their enrollees.
22 See article 45-5 ZvW (Health Insurance Act).
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Figure 6: Overview of funding streams in the Netherlands
This system of fi nancing creates income solidarity (the transfer of income 
from richer citizens to poorer citizens) through the income-dependent funding 
stream. By redistributing the tax-funded stream to insurers on the basis of on 
the risk profi le of their policyholders, the fi nancing scheme aims to create risk 
solidarity too.
The average nominal premium paid in 2015 was € 1,158 per year.23 The income 
dependent premium in 2016 is set at 6.75% of a maximum annual taxable 
income of € 52,76324. Households with an annual income of less than € 33,67525 
are eligible for a tax allowance. In 2015, 4.5 million households received a tax 
23  Source: NZa marktscan 2016. https://www.nza.nl/publicaties/1048188/Marktscan_Zorgverzeke-
ringsmarkt_2015_update_mei_2016
24  Source: http://www.belastingdienst.nl/wps/wcm/connect/bldcontentnl/belastingdienst/prive/
werk_en_inkomen/zorgverzekeringswet/veranderingen_bijdrage_zvw_2016/veranderingen_inko-
mensafhankelijke_bijdrage_zvw_2016
25  With only one person working per household, the maximum income is €27,012 per year. Source:  
http://www.belastingdienst.nl/wps/wcm/connect/bldcontentnl/belastingdienst/prive/toeslagen/zorg-
toeslag/zorgtoeslag_2016/voorwaarden_2016/inkomen/de_hoogte_van_mijn_inkomen 
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allowance of, on average, € 828 annually.26
Risk adjustment
The nominal premium insurers that charge to their enrollees may differ 
between policies, but must be the same for all consumers.27 In other words, 
premium differentiation is not allowed. 
Under a system such as the Dutch system, with mandatory acceptance and a ban 
on premium differentiation, insurers are incentivized to engage in risk selection 
because they stand to gain from policyholders who have lower healthcare costs. 
The incentive therefore exists for them to actively seek out attractive consumers 
and discourage potentially loss-making consumers by targeting specific 
consumers using specific marketing or by providing better or worse services for 
specific consumers. Another option is to let consumers self-select by offering 
specific contracts to specific groups. Insurers could, for example, offer a contract 
with a very limited network of providers and a low premium, with high co-
payments if patients go outside the specified network. Such a contract would 
only be attractive to healthy consumers.
If a particular health plan does not adjust its premium for a risk factor that is 
known either to the individual policyholder or to the plan, low-risk individuals 
will tend to choose a competing plan that offers a lower premium or a contract 
that is specifically designed to attract low-risk individuals. Consequently, the 
first plan, which is left with only high-risk individuals, will be forced to increase 
its premium. In this way, in the absence of any restrictions on premiums, a 
competitive health plan market will tend to result in risk-adjusted premiums 
that differentiate according to the individual consumer’s risk. This is known as 
the equivalence principle.
The absence of risk adjustment may also lead to under an undersupply of good 
healthcare, thus jeopardizing the policy objective of quality. Beaulieu et al. 
(2006) provide an example of what happens when there is no or insufficient 
risk adjustment. The paper studies a specific Diabetes Disease Management 
26  Source: Budget Ministry of Health 2016 https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/prinsjesdag/
documenten/begrotingen/2015/09/15/xvi-volksgezondheid-welzijn-en-sport-rijksbegroting-2016
27  With one notable exception: insurers are allowed to give rebates on collective contracts.
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program (DDM) by HealthPartners28, which was designed to improve the health 
status of diabetes patients and mitigate the effects of diabetes. Apart from the 
improvement in health status, the healthcare cost per diabetes patients per year 
were also substantially reduced ($1,900 per diabetic patient), which is equal to 
approximately 15% of actual medical care costs for diabetic members. Because 
of the improved healthcare for diabetes patients, HealthPartners attracted more 
new diabetes patients. Since diabetes patients incur higher healthcare costs than 
average policyholders, the cost savings of the DDM actually led to an overall loss 
for HealthPartners. Beaulieu et al. (2006) estimate the cost of extra diabetes 
patients to be $2,338 per diabetic enrollee per year, which means that “adverse 
selection costs could far exceed the benefits of high quality diabetes care and 
present a serious deterrent to health plans adopting these programs when 
premiums paid to the plan are not risk adjusted.”
Risk adjustment is a necessary pre-condition in a system of managed 
competition and mandatory insurance in order to prevent risk selection and 
to incentivize insurers to contract care that maximizes public health policy 
objectives.
The risk adjustment system began in a very basic form in 1993, with age and 
gender. Since that time, the model has gradually evolved and improved. See 
Van Kleef et al. (2013) for an overview. And although the risk adjustment 
scheme is considered good, there remain sub-groups which are under- and over 
compensated.
As an example, the figure below shows the amount that an insurer currently 
receives (2016) from the risk adjustment fund for a healthy 39-year-old male.29
There are several types of cost that the model takes into account: variable 
healthcare costs (including hospital costs), the cost of care and nursing, curative 
mental healthcare and intramural mental healthcare. For each type of cost, the 
model uses the characteristics discussed below.
28 HealthPartners, a vertically integrated health system (health insurance and healthcare provision) 
based in Minneapolis, Minnesota USA.  
29 Data from https://www.zorginstituutnederland.nl/binaries/content/documents/zinl-www/verze-
kering/risicoverevening-zvw/zvw-2016/zvw-2016/zvw-2016/zinl%3Adocuments%5B4%5D/1511-regel-
ing-risicoverevening-2016/Regeling+risicoverevening+2016.pdf
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The model begins with gender and age. For a 39-year-old male, an insurer 
receives a total of € 1,996.39 per year. Because this male has not previously been 
ill (no former diagnosis (DKG) and no former pharmaceutical drug use (FKG)), 
the amount that the insurer receives for this person is reduced by, respectively, 
€ 288.19 annually and  € 352 annually. 
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Gender/Age Man 39 1,474.21 160.95 304.58 17.65 1,996.39
FKG29 None -243.41 -13.06 -31.72 -288.19
DKG30 None -269.63 -9.85 -71.89 -1.01 -352.38
HKG31 None -15.72 -3.84 -19.56
AVI32 Refer-
ence
-43.91 8.60 -33.07 -68.38
Zip code 1462 -49.86 2.45 -8.96 -56.37
SES33 High -169.71 -51.27 -18.46 -3.44 -242.88
MHK34 None -251.36 -13.63 -264.99
VGG35 None -29.29 -137.99 -167.28
FGG36 None -10.91 1.34 -9.57
GGG37 None 1.21 -2.59 -1.38
Co-Morbidity None -54.59 8.44 -46.15
Epa38 No -14.44 -14.44
IGG39 None -11.71 -11.71
Total 453.11
Table 1: An example of a risk adjustment payment for a healthy 39-year-old male
30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40
30 FKG: Farmaceutical Cost Group 
31 DKG: Dianogstic Cost Group  
32  HKG: Medical Aid Devices Group  
33 AVI: Source of Income  
34  SES: Source of Income  
35  MHK: Multiple Year High Cost Group 
36  VGG: Former use of care and nursing 
37  FGG: Former use of fysiotherapy 
38  GGG: Former use of mental healthcare 
39  Epa: One person house hold 
40  IGG: Former use of intramural mental healthcare 
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The figure below shows the financial impact of some changes in the policyhold-
er’s characteristics. If the 39-year-old in question is a woman – holding all the 
other indicators fixed – the insurer receives E 494.85 per year more. If the male 
in question is a diagnosed hemophiliac, the insurer would receive an extra 
E 48,383.28 per year. The use of Intramural Mental Healthcare would increase 
the amount received by the insurer by E€75,259.21 per year. 
Indicator Value Delta
Gender/Age Woman 39 +       494.85
FKG40 Parkinson +    2,571.58
DKG41 Hemophilia +  48,383.28
HKG42 Trancheo stoma +  10,475.26
AVI43 Social security benefit +       605.77
Postcode 1443 +       112.63
SES44 Very Low +       306.56
MHK45 Top-group +  37,763.69
VGG46 Top 0.25% +  26,710.72
FGG47 Top 2% +       479.68
GGG48 Top 0.275% +       584.57
Co-Morbidity Yes +       251.77
Epa49 Yes +         82.40
IGG50 Use of IGG +  75,259.21
Table 2: The impact of changes in the characteristics of the policyholder.
41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51
41 FKG: Farmaceutical Cost Group  
42 DKG: Dianogstic Cost Group 
43 HKG: Medical Aid Devices Group 
44 AVI: Source of Income 
45 SES: Source of Income
46 MHK: Multiple Year High Cost Group  
47 VGG: Former use of care and nursing 
48 FGG: Former use of fysiotherapy 
49 GGG: Former use of mental healthcare 
50 Epa: One person house hold  
51 IGG: Former use of intramural mental healthcare 
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The competitiveness of Dutch insurance and hospital markets
As mentioned above, the Dutch system is designed with the idea that 
competition between insurers for enrollees and competition between providers 
for contracts will help to achieve policy objectives. In this section, I would like 
to discuss whether the insurance markets and hospital markets are, in reality, 
competitive enough. 
Insurance markets and some provider markets (especially GPs, mental 
healthcare, some parts of long-term care and hospitals) are concentrated. In 
this section, I will focus on the insurance market and the hospital market. 
The idea of competitive markets is that patients and enrollees have a choice 
and that parties that negotiate have alternative parties to contract with. Market 
power (both as a buyer and as a seller) may lead to higher prices, lower quality 
and lower accessibility. However, concentration can also lead to economies of 
scale: insurers and providers may be able to operate more efficiently or improve 
quality by scaling up. 
Insurance Market
Health insurance can be regarded as an option on a bundle of access rights 
relating to healthcare. The value of this bundle for a particular consumer 
depends on how much that consumer values the underlying network to which 
the insurance gives access. Since travel distance accounts for much of the 
variation when consumers are choosing a healthcare provider (see Halbersma 
et al. 2009 for the case of hospitals), I would argue that consumers would value 
networks that include providers close to their homes. I would therefore like to 
show the concentration of the insurance market at a local level. Another reason 
for presenting concentration at a local level is that negotiations with healthcare 
providers (such as hospitals, general practitioners, physiotherapists, dentists 
etc.) also take place at this local level.
While figure 7 below shows that local healthcare markets are concentrated52, 
even the market at a national level could be seen as concentrated (see NZa 
2016).53 
52 HHI stands for Herfindahl-Hirschman Index of concentration. The HHI is calculated by squaring 
the market shares of firms active in a market. In the case of figure 7, the HHI consists of the summed 
market squares of insurers per municipality.
53 The HHI on a national level is 2.224 (NZa 2016). A market with a HHI larger than 1800 may be 
considered have a ‘high concentration’ (see Motta 2004).
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Figure 7: concentration in the Dutch health insurance market.
Source NZa (2016).
The Dutch health insurance market consists of four large firms which, together, 
serve together nearly 90% of the Dutch population (see NZa 2016) and 5 other 
smaller firms. 
Since we do not currently have an established method for measuring the market 
power of health insurers directly, we will look at some trends on the health 
insurance market.
Price dispersion has increased since 2006, which means that consumers have 
more to gain if they switch from insurer.
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Figure 8: premium dispersion on the health insurance market. 
However, as figure 9 shows (below), the percentage of the population that 
switched has increased slightly, but seems to have remained relatively stable 
since 2012.54
Figure 9: Percentage of switchers on the health insurance market. Source NZa-data.
54  The high percentage of switching 2006 is caused by the introduction of the new system in 2006.
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The number of health plans has broadly increased since 2006. In 2016, the 
number of plans fell by ten. Frank and Lamiraud (2009) show that the more 
choice there is between health plans, the less likely consumers are to switch. 
They find a negative relationship between the number of plans and the 
competiveness of the market. In one model, they find that in Swiss cantons 
where consumers can choose between more than 55 plans, switching is 
significantly lower than in cantons with less choice. We cannot repeat such a 
study in the Netherlands, due to the fact we do not have regional variation.
Figure 10: the number of health plans per year.  Source NZa-data
Finally, we can look at the net profit margin of health insurers in comparison to 
other insurance sectors. While the net margin (excluding investment profits) of 
the total damage insurance sector (excluding health insurance) has fallen over 
the years, the net margin of health insurers has increased. Since 2012, the net 
margin in the damage insurance sector has been negative. The health insurance 
sector55 started with negative net margins at the time of the reforms of 2006. 
However, net margins increased and the health insurance sector has been 
profitable since 2009.
55 Part of the damage insurance sector, but excluded from the data of the damage insurance sector in 
Figure 11.
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Figure 11: Net margins (net profi t excluding profi ts on investment, as a percentage of gross premiums) of 
health insurers versus the net margins of the damage insurers (entire sector, excluding health insurance).
Source: Dutch Central Bank56
The trends presented in this paragraph can be summarized as follows:
1. the market is concentrated
2. a small number of insurers offer many plans
3. price dispersion is increasing
4. switching is not increasing
5. profi ts are increasing (in relation to other categories of insurance)
 
All these developments together make it plausible that the health insurance 
market is becoming less competitive. 
Loozen et al. (2016) conclude that hospitals, pharmacies and general 
practitioners have market power; nevertheless, insurers may still have 
bargaining power in relation to paramedical professionals. This bargaining 
power may have negative welfare consequences, because the quality of medical 
professionals may deteriorate. 
56  See http://www.dnb.nl/statistiek/statistieken-dnb/fi nanciele-instellingen/verzekeraars/
toezichtgegevens-verzekeraars/index.jsp
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The health insurance market could benefit from greater transparency. For 
example, it is currently often unclear to consumers how certain choices can 
affect their deductibles and/or co-payments if they choose healthcare providers 
outside their insurer’s contracted network. 
Consumers may find it easier to choose an appropriate plan if their choice were 
clearer. For example, plans could be categorized into plans with access to all 
providers, plans with broad access and plans with narrow access.57 Finally, firms 
offer identical plans under different names and at different prices. I would 
argue that a legal requirement for insurers to actively inform consumers if they 
offer a similar plan at a cheaper price would also increase the competiveness of 
the health insurance market. 
Hospital market
Although we have no way of measuring market power in the insurance market 
directly, new tools for measuring market power in the hospital markets have 
been developed, of which the Option Demand Method (Capps et al. 2003) and 
the LOCI method (see Antwi et al. 2013) would seem to be the most robust (See 
Garmon 2015 for a discussion and application of all methods in the context of 
merger simulation). Since the estimates of the Option Demand Method and the 
LOCI produce similar results when applied to the Netherlands (see Kerstholt et 
al. 2009), I will use the LOCI method to determine the weighted market share,58 
which is presented in Figure 12.
Figure 12, below, shows that the hospital market in the Netherlands is concen-
trated. Many hospitals have a market share of over 55% and are assumed to have 
market power59. Although many hospitals do have market power, there is no 
correlation between weighted market share and hospital prices at the present 
time60. Health insurers and hospitals have only been able to negotiate on large 
portions of production since 2012. The individual negotiations between health 
insurers and hospitals seem to be greatly influenced by a national agreement 
between the associations of health insurers, hospitals and the government, 
57  Plans in which access to a small group of providers requires extra co-payments.
58  Defined as 1-LOCI.
59  The Dutch Healthcare Market Regulation Act (WMG) states it is plausible that hospitals with a 
market share with a market share above 40% have market power. Hospitals with a market share above 
55% are assumed to have market power.
60 Halbersma et al. (2011) found a correlation between concentration and prices in the period just after 
the reform. That correlation disappeared in later years.  
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which stipulates that healthcare costs could only increase by 2.5% per year in 
real terms.61
The effect of competition on quality is less clear, because data on the quality 
provided is scarce. Bijlsma et al. (2013) find that “competition among hospitals 
(…) explains differences in several process indicators, but fails to explain 
differences in outcome indicators”. 
However, the hospital market in the Netherlands is very concentrated. The 
international literature62 suggests that concentration and mergers lead to higher 
prices. The effect of concentration and mergers on quality is less clear. In some 
studies, greater competition leads to better quality, while in other studies it leads 
to a deterioration in quality.
61  https://www.rijksoverheid.nl/documenten/besluiten/2011/07/05/bestuurlijk-hoofdlijnenak-
koord-2012-2015
62  For a literature overview both on price and quality Gaynor and Town (2012).
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An international 
comparison
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An international comparison
Now that we have discussed the specifics of the Dutch healthcare system, I 
would like to compare the outcomes of the Dutch system to the outcomes of 
other healthcare systems in other countries. The data used in this paragraph 
were compiled by the OECD.63 Outcomes of healthcare and healthcare systems 
are difficult to measure. Furthermore, many factors can influence health status, 
and the healthcare system is only one of these factors. Education and the 
composition of the population are examples of other factors that influence the 
health status of a particular country’s population. International comparisons are 
also difficult, because countries often define and compile data differently.
In this section, I would like to compare countries on indicators that may 





The total cost of healthcare as a percentage of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) is 
often used in international comparisons as an indicator of the affordability of a 
healthcare system. In this address, we are mainly interested in the Dutch 
mandatory health insurance system (“the second pillar”). Since the Netherlands 
has a very expensive system of long-term care (see Ewijk et al. 2013), I will 
not use the total cost of healthcare as an indicator of affordability. Instead, I 
will – following van Ewijk et. al (2013) – use curative costs per capita (defined 
as the sum of cost categories, curative and rehabilitative care services, 
ancillary healthcare services and medical goods) as an indicator of healthcare 
affordability.
63 See for the source data used in this paragraph: http://www.oecd.org/els/health-systems/health-data.
htm
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Figure 13: The curative cost per capita in PPP (purchasing power parity) in 2013.
The fi gure shows that Switzerland had the highest curative costs per capita 
in 2013. In general, the countries of Western Europe have higher costs than 
Eastern European Countries. Costs in the Netherlands are comparable with 
countries like Germany, Sweden, France and Denmark, while Belgium and 
Finland are slightly cheaper.
Figure 14: Spending on curative healthcare64 as a percentage of GDP (Gross Domestic Product)
64 Curative healthcare is defi ned as the of spending on Services of curative and rehabilitative care, 
Ancillary services to healthcare and medical goods.
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The fi gure shows spending on curative healthcare as a percentage of GDP for a 
group of comparable countries. As a percentage of GDP, healthcare spending 
in the Netherlands is lower than many others. Furthermore, it is noticeable 
that countries follow very similar patterns in healthcare spending, regardless of 
which system they have in place. 
Figure 15: growth of healthcare spending before and after the reform in the Netherlands
Many people in the Netherlands think that the healthcare reform in 2006 led to 
an increase in costs. However, the fi gure above shows that in fact the increase 
in costs was higher in the period 2000-2005 than in the period 2006-2013. 
The same is true of most countries, but the Netherlands, Hungary and Portugal 
reduced their increase in healthcare spending the most. In the period 2006-
2013, the Netherlands had a similar percentage of growth as the Czech Republic, 
Finland, Sweden, Australia, France, Austria and Canada. All these countries 
have very different healthcare systems, yet this does not seem to have had much 
impact on the cost increases.
Quality
As a measure of quality, I will use life expectancy at birth. This is the broadest 
indicator of the performance of a healthcare system for the dimension of 
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quality. Life expectancy is not  infl uenced by the healthcare system alone, 
however. Non-medical determinants of health (such as education, life style and 
behavioral factors) are also important. However, healthcare spending does have 
an impact on the life expectancy. Cutler et al. (2006) assume – based on earlier 
literature – that 50 percent of improvements in longevity are contingent on 
medical care.
Figure 16: Life expectancy at birth, total population65
In the section on affordability, we saw that the cost of healthcare has increased 
in all countries. From the fi gure above, we see that the life expectancy also 
increased in all the countries presented. Again, all countries seem to follow 
a similar trend. The Netherlands ranks as an average country in the group of 
countries presented above.
Accessibility
Access to healthcare is an important public policy objective. As an indicator for 
access, we use the percentage of people that report that they have not received 
the care they needed because they could not afford it, there were waiting lists, or 
they had to travel too far. 
65 Source OECD health data base,  http://stats.oecd.org/index.aspx?DataSetCode=HEALTH_STAT
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Figure 17: Unmet demand for care for medical examination, by income level, 2013; 
order: high income, national average, low income.66
From the fi gure above, we can see that the Netherlands scores very well on this 
indicator. Although competition in healthcare is often associated with lower 
solidarity, the Netherlands seems to have a system with good solidarity. Not 
only is the percentage of people that do not receive the treatment they need 
low, in the Netherlands differences between people on a low income and those 
on a higher income are also very low. Obviously, the fact that the Netherlands 
is a densely populated country is an important factor that contributes to lower 
travel times. But the Netherlands also scores well on other aspects (fi nancial 
accessibility and waiting lists). 
66 Figure reproduced from OECD (2015)
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Integrated view
In the above sections, we have compared a selection of OECD countries on 
different dimensions. We have compared healthcare costs, quality and access. 
An “ideal” country with the lowest costs and the highest quality and access is 
unrealistic, so instead we will use Data Envelopment Analysis67 to compare 
countries for the year 2013 and compute efficiency scores for each68.
In the analysis presented below, we calculate how ‘efficiently’ a country 
transforms healthcare inputs (in our case the curative costs per capita) into 
healthcare outputs (in our case life expectancy at birth and accessibility69). 
Benchmarking is a tool for comparing different organizations or processes. 
Benchmarking is often done by comparing key performance indicators (KPIs). 
When comparing different healthcare systems, it is possible to compare 
countries on different aspects such as cost per capita, quality provided and so 
on, as has been done above. However, KPI comparison has a few drawbacks. 
The main drawback is that it remains a partial analysis and does not allow us 
to draw more general conclusions. There are many types of benchmarking 
methods (e.g. Correct Ordinary Least Squares (COLS), Stochastic Frontier 
Analysis (SFA), Stochastic DEA (SDEA) and DEA), each with their strengths and 
weaknesses. 
To compare different healthcare systems, I have chosen to use DEA, because 
it can handle multiple inputs and outputs, and allows the use of different scale 
properties.70 DEA is a benchmarking tool that uses mathematical programming 
methods to estimate best practice production frontiers to evaluate the relative 
efficiency of different organizations (Bogetoft 2013).
An efficiency score of 0.5 means that a country could achieve the same outputs 
with only 50% of the costs. An efficiency score of 1 means that no other 
countries can produce the same output for lower costs.
67 See Bogetoft and Otto (2010) for a more detailed consideration of benchmarking models and the 
benchmarking packages in R that I have used for these computations.
68 This analysis is not a scientific exercise, but should be regarded as an illustration.
69 I define access here as 100 – the average percentage of people that reported unmet care due to 
financial reasons, waiting lists and travel time.
70 For this analysis I have used the Variable Returns to Scale (VRS) assumption.
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Figure 18: Effi ciency scores of different healthcare systems
The Netherlands has an effi ciency score of 1, meaning that our system performs 
very well in comparison to the other healthcare systems for the dataset that was 
analyzed. This is mainly due to fact that the Netherlands has the best access to 
healthcare. 
It is noticeable that most western European countries (with the Netherlands and 
Spain being exceptions) have low effi ciency scores. These scores could be due to 
higher salaries for doctors (because the generally higher income levels in these 
countries). The effi ciency scores can be explained by the salaries of the doctors.
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Figure 19: Salaries of doctors and effi ciency scores
The income received by doctors seems to have a major impact on healthcare 
costs; they are particularly high in the Netherlands, Denmark and Germany. 
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How to improve the 
Dutch healthcare system?
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Referenties
The Dutch system is, in conceptual terms, a very good idea, because it combines 
solidarity (every citizen has access to healthcare) with competition. Delegations 
from all over the world visit the Dutch Healthcare Authority to learn about our 
system. 
We have compared the performance of the Dutch system to that of other 
countries. Although the Dutch system does not perform badly, it is hard to 
conclude that one type of system is intrinsically better than another. Many 
countries with different healthcare systems seem to be susceptible to similar 
developments with respect to rising costs and life expectancy.  
Just because our system is satisfactory in conceptual terms and many countries 
are interested in emulating it, this does not mean our system is perfect. In this 
section, I will present a number of suggestions for improvement.
The main problem in the Netherlands (as in most countries) is the lack of 
information about the outcomes of healthcare interventions. This lack of 
information is a problem because patients are not able to choose the providers 
that achieve the best outcomes. If patients were able to choose on the basis of 
such information, doctors would have a greater incentive to learn from each 
other and improve. Information about the outcome of healthcare interventions 
may also make patients more willing to travel to receive care, and this could 
reinforce competition between providers.
Another – associated – problem is that insurers and the government do not base 
their contracts and regulation on healthcare outcomes. Instead, they pay for 
interventions and curb costs by means of budgets. These payment methods lead 
to both under- and over treatment. Payments based on healthcare outcomes 
would improve performance in the healthcare system. There has been some 
progress in the Netherlands during recent years, but an evaluation of the Dutch 
Healthcare Market Regulation Act (WMG)71 indicates that there has been too 
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Of course, health outcomes are difficult to measure. However, the International 
Consortium for Health Outcomes Measurement (ICHOM)72 has developed 
standardized indicators for health outcomes for a number of diseases. I would 
recommend that research should be done into how these indicators could be 
used in the Netherlands. 
Some patients might have difficulty understanding and interpreting information 
about the quality of care. It would be a good idea to put in place a system 
whereby general practitioners help their patients to choose.73 Since the prices of 
GPs are regulated, a change in the regulatory regime may be necessary. 
Providers that achieve better value (which includes the aspects of quality 
and cost) should be better-off. Value does not play any role in most insurers’ 
contracts and in the regulation of prices by the government. A further challenge 
for the coming years is to move towards a system that rewards providers for 
generating good value, rather than a system that rewards intervention, which we 
currently have.
As mentioned above, the risk adjustment scheme undercompensates 
some groups of people with health problems and overcompensates healthy 
individuals. Less compensation for healthy people would give insurers a greater 
incentive to invest in better healthcare for those who need healthcare.  
The organization and financing of healthcare is based on institutions (e.g. 
hospitals, home care organizations and so on). Patients often have to contend 
with multiple problems at the same time (take, for example, an 80-year-old 
woman with diabetes and breast cancer who is married to an 85-year-old man 
with Parkinson’s disease). Treating one problem may affect other problems and 
the couple’s home situation. In order to improve coordination and healthcare 
outcomes, I think that a further move towards bundled payments is necessary. 
We have seen such a shift already, recently, for chronic diseases such as COPD 
and diabetes as well as for natal care.
72  http://www.ichom.org/
73 For example like the choose and book website in the UK. See Gaynor et al. (2012)
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Since our system is based on competition between insurers and competition 
between providers, I would argue for stricter controls on mergers and greater 
transparency in the insurance market
Our healthcare system has now existed in its current form for 10 years. The first 
10 years of system was devoted to deregulation and decentralizing decision-
making powers to insurers and providers. It is now time to focus on the 
outcomes of our healthcare system.
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Words of gratitude
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Let me conclude with some words of gratitude. 
I am very grateful to the board of NZa and in particular to Marian Kaljouw 
for establishing the endowed chair. I would like to thank the board of Tilburg 
University and the appointment committee for their appointment. Willem 
Meegens helped a great deal with fulfilling the administrative requirements. 
I would like to thank Urmila Bihari (NZa) and Sylvia Hoyinck (Tilburg 
University) for the help they provided in the organization of the inaugural 
address.
Jan Boone, as dean of the Department of Economics of the Tilburg School of 
Economics and Management, played a major role in the establishment of the 
chair and my appointment.
I’m very proud and happy to be able to work with you. 
I would also like to thank all of my co-authors for their academic work. I 
appreciate the opportunity to be able to work with my great EMB-colleagues. 
Some of my co-authors have become more than just colleagues: Mark, Gustaaf, 
Katalin and Rein, it has been an enormous pleasure to work with you and I hope 
we may continue to do so. 
Of my colleagues, I work very closely with Ramsis. He is always relaxed, very 
skillful and full of jokes and good humor, it is a privilege to work with him.
Victoria, my first academic partner in 2001, has become a very special friend 
of our family. I’m delighted that she joined NZa two years ago, so that we can 
work together again. I would like to thank her for her collaboration and her 
friendship. She was a great help with discussing and reading this address.
Ramsis and Katalin also contributed to this inaugural address with comments, 
help and discussion.
I would like to express my gratitude to Peter Bogetoft and Wijbrand Bins for 
being my mentors up until today. I have learned a lot from both of you about 
life in general and economics in particular. Peter Bogetoft gave me some sound 
advice on the benchmarking section.
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I’m indebted to my family, and to Menna, Anke and Henk in particular for all 
their love and support. Without their help, this appointment would not have 
been possible. 
Finally, I would like to express my deepest gratitude to Sandra, Arvid, Finn and 
Silas. Sandra, you are the most beautiful thing that has ever happened to me. 
You and the boys are the most important thing in my life.
Ik heb gezegd.
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